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ORAL CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF STANDING TIVIBER
IN KENTUCKY
Section 4 of the English Statute of Frauds has been enacted m
similar form in most of the states of the United States.' This section
is incorporated in IRS 371.010 providing:
"No action shall be brought to charge any person:
(6) upon any contract for the sale of real estate,
unless the promise, contract, agreement, representation,
assurance or ratification, or some memorandum or note
thereof, be in writing and signed by the party to be
charged therewith, or by his authorized agent. "
In connection with this section the courts have been called upon
to decide if a contract for the sale of standing timber for immediate
severance concerns land so as to require it to be in writing to be
enforceable."
The English courts have gone to considerable length to hold
that such a sale is not a sale of an interest m land.' However, the
decisions have not been uniform.4 In Teal v. Auty' the sale of stand-
ing poles was deemed a sale of an interest in land.
In 1875 the English Court most clearly stated its position in
Marshall v. Green." The defendant in that case orally purchased
twenty-two standing trees. "The trees to be got away as soon as
possible."' After the defendant had entered upon the land and cut
six trees, the plaintiff countermanded the sale. The countermand
was ignored by the defendant, and he entered and cut the remain-
ing trees. In denying the plaintiff recovery for trespass, the court
held that the sale was of chattels only and need not be evidenced by
writing.
In the United States most of the states that have considered the
question have expressly held that a sale of standing trees is a sale of
CLARK, CONTRACTS sec. 39 (4th ed. 1931)
-McKenzie v. Shows, 35 Miss. 700, 12 So. 336 (1893), Lillie v.
Dunbar, 43 Wis. 569, 22 N.W 467 (1885)
"2 WmLISTON, CONTRACTS sec. 516 (1926).
4 Teal v. Auty, 2 Br. & B. 99, 129 Eng. Rep. 895 (1820).
Contra: Smith v Surman, 9 B. & C. 561, 109 Eng. Rep. 209
(1829)
- 2 Br. & B. 99, 129 Eng. Rep. 895 (1820)
"1 C.P.D. 35 (1875).
Id. at 36.
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an interest in land.' Connecticut, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, and
Massachusetts have held that the sale is of chattels only"
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has held that a sale of standing
trees in contemplation of immediate severance is not one concerning
land.'8 To arrive at this conclusion, the court has adopted a legal
fiction that since the parties do not intend to embrace the land,' the
trees are constructively severed by the contract and they pass as
chattels.' As a foundation for this rule the court has used the equi-
table maxim that that which was intended to be done will be con-
sidered as having been done. =
In explaining the meaning of immediate severance the court in
Byassee v. Reese4 said:
"The phrase 'in contemplation of immediate sepa-
ration from the soil,' is used to distinguish a sale of
standing trees, or growing crops, which passes no in-
terest in land, except a license to enter upon it for the
purpose of removing them, from a contract conferring
an exclusive right to the land for a time for the pur-
pose of making a profit out of the growth upon it."'
According to the opinion in Cheatham v. Head," "immediate,"
as used in the above phrase, does not mean that the severance must
take place at once. The severance need take place only as soon
as reasonably can be done under the circumstances considering the
amount of timber, its accessibility, and labor conditions."'
Although it is unnecessary that a definite time be stated within
which the severance must take place," unless the trees are sold in
contemplation of inmediate severance, their character is not
changed from realty to personalty." If the trees are sold in con-
'Griffith v Ayer-Lord Tie Co., 109 Ark. 223, 159 S.W 218
(1913), Coody v. Gress Lumber Co., 82 Ga. 793, 10 S.E. 218 (1889),
Hostetter v Auman, 119 Ind. 7, 20 N.E. 506 (1889), Hirth v. Graham,
50 Ohio St. 57, 33 N.E. 90 (1893), as set out in 1 WILLISTON, SALES sec.
62 (Rev. Ed. 1948) at page 159 footnote 14.
'Bostwick v Leach, 3 Day (Conn.) 476 (1809), Cam v. McGuire,
52 Ky (13 B. Mon.) 340 (1852), Whittington v Hall, 116 Md. 467,
82 Atl. 163 (1911), Claflin v Carpenter, 45 Mass. (4 Metc.) 580
(1842). See Erskine v. Plummer, 7 Greenl. Rep. (Me.) 447, 451
(1842)
"'Prater v. Campbell, 110 Ky. 23, 60 S.W 918 (1901).
'Cain v McGuire, 52 Ky. (13 B. Mon.) 273 (1852).
"Byassee v. Reese, 61 Ky (4 Metc.) 334, 336 (1863).
'Gabbard v. Sheffield, 179 Ky. 442, 450, 200 S.W 940, 944
(1918)
' 61 Ky. (4 Metc.) 334 (1863).
"Ibid.
203 Ky 489, 262 S.W 622 (1924).
"Id. at 494, 262 S.W 622, 624 (1924)
'Byassee v. Reese, 61 Ky (4 Metc.) 334 (1863).
"Gabbard v Sheffield, 179 Ky. 442, 450,200 S.W 622, 624
(1918).
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templation of immediate severance, and they are not removed within
a reasonable time or within the time fixed in the contract for their
removal, they cease to be chattels and are restored to the status
of real estate.'
In order to invest the purchaser with title, it is necessary that
the trees be designated so they can be identified as those sold.' Thus,
where the sale is of timber generally or a part of the timber on a
specified tract, title will not pass unless the trees are suitably
marked.2 In Moss v. Meshew' the court held that a sale of enough
trees to make 40,000 staves did not pass title in the absence of mark-
ing, and did not give the purchaser the right to enter and cut the
timber without the consent of the seller. Thus interpreting the sale
of standing trees for immediate severance as a sale of personalty,
the Kentucky Court of Appeals until 1900 held that an oral con-
tract was valid.:'
In 1900 the Legislature of Kentucky enacted what is now KRS
371.100 which provides:
"No contract for the sale of standing trees or
standing timber shall be enforceable by action unless
the contract or some memorandum thereof is in writing,
signed by the person to be charged or by his duly
authorized agent."
Accordingly, in 1911, the court held in Sears v. Ohler that under
the statute a parol contract for the sale of standing timber was un-
enforceable and no action could be maintained by either party to
recover damages for its breach. The defendant in that case had al-
ready entered upon the land and removed part of the timber, and
the court held that although no action would lie on the contract, the
plaintiff could recover in assumpsit for the timber which the de-
fendant had already received under the contract.
Ky. Stat. sec. 1409-14, also enacted m 1900, stated:
"Wherever any timber shall be branded by the
seller, or another with his consent, with the brand of
the purchaser or other person or corporation, then the
title to said timber shall at once pass to the person
or corporation whose brand is thus placed upon it, but
this shall not affect the rights of the contracting parties
with respect to the payment of the purchase money
therefor."
Interpreting this statute in Burrs v. Stepp.' the court held that
the branding did not take the place of the requirement of the writ-
" Ibid.
"Minor v. Barlow, 9 Ky Ops. 86 (1876).
2 lbid.
171 Ky. (8 Bush) 187 (1871).
"Prater v. Campbell, 110 Ky. 23, 60 S.W 918 (1901)
144 Ky. 473, 139 S.W 759 (1911).
162 Ky. 269, 172 S.W 526 (1915).
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ing. Since KRS 371.100 did not require that the writing have the
attributes of a recorded instrument, the two sections taken to-
gether meant that whenever the particular timber contracted for
was branded by the seller or some other person with his consent
then the sale had the same effect and force as to creditors and inno-
cent purchasers as a recorded sale of land.
To conform to the opinion in the above case, Ky. Stat. 1409-14
was revised. The revised statute reads as follows:
"Branding of timber, effect as to third persons (1)
When a valid sale of standing timber has been made in
KRS 371.100 and the timber has been branded by the
seller, or another with his consent, with the brand of
the purchaser, the sale shall have the same effect as to
creditors and innocent purchasers as a recorded sale
of land."
The Uniform Sales Act was enacted by the Kentucky Legislature
in 1928. Section 76 of this act which appears as KRS 361.760 pro-
vides:
"In this chapter, unless the context or subject
matter otherwise requires: 'Goods' include all chattels
personal other than thines in action and money. The
term includes implements, industrial growing crops,
and things attached to or forming part of the land which
are agreed to be severed before sale or under the con-
tract of sale."
While section 4 of the Uniform Sales Act, being KRS 361.040,
states:
"(1) A contract to sell or a sale of any goods or
choses in action of the value of five hundred dollars or
upwards shall not be enforceable by action unless the
buyer shall accept part of the goods or choses in action
so contracted to be sold or sold, and actually receive
the same, or give something in earnest to bind the
contract, or in part payment, or unless some note or
memorandum in writing of the contract or sale be
signed by the party to be charged or his agent in that
behalf."
Thus by reason of KRS 361.760 a sale of standing trees is a sale
of personalty. If KRS 371.100 provides that a sale of standing timber
is a sale of realty, the two statutes would be inconsistent, and per-
haps KRS 361.760 acted as a repeal of KRS 371.100. If KRS 371.100
was repealed, an oral contract for the sale of standing timber would
be valid unless it fell within KRS 361.040. The statutes are not in-
consistent upon their face as KRS 371.100 does not expressly provide
that a sale of standing trees is a sale of realty, but merely requires
that the contract be in writing to be enforceable. However, since the
construction of the statute requirmgi contracts for the sale of real
estate to be in writing and the statute requiring contracts for the
sale of standing timber to be in writing are so similar in construc-
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lion, it would seem possible that the court could infer that it was
the intent of the legislature when it passes KRS 371.100 to declare
a sale of standing timber to be a sale of realty The court has not
chosen to so interpret the statute, hence, the statutes are not incon-
-sistent by express language or judicial interpretation.
Since the passage of the Uniform Sales Act only one case,
Patton v. Lucy," involving an oral sale of trees has been considered
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals. In that case the plaintiff sought
an injunction to restrain the defendant from cutting timber on his,
the plaintiff's land. Prior to the plaintiff's purchase of the land, the
defendant had orally purchased the timber from Church. When the
plaintiff bought the land, he had notice of the contract between
Church and the defendant. In denying the plaintiff an injunction the
court said:
"The purpose of the statute (KRS 371.100) is ap-
parently intended to fix the rights of the parties 'to be
charged' and to fix the rights of the contracting
parties."-'
KRS 361.760 was not mentioned.
It is submitted that KRS 361.760 did not repeal KRS 371.100,
and at the present time an oral contract for standing trees is unen-
lorceable as between the parties. However, where the parties to the
contract wish to adhere to the contract, an intervening third party
cannot assert its invalidity
JOSEPH C. THOMPSON.
- 285 Ky. 694, 148 S.W 2d 1039 (1940)
Id. at 697, 148 S.W 2d at 1040.
